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Asymmetric Labor Force Participation Decisions Over the Business Cycle:  
Evidence from U.S. Micro-data 
 
I. Introduction 
  The tendency for the proportion of labor market participants who are unemployed to 
increase quickly during periods of economic weakness and to fall slowly during the subsequent 
recovery is a well-documented phenomenon (for example, see Neftci 1984 and Koop and Potter 
1999).  Figure 1 illustrates the asymmetric movement of the unemployment rate in the U.S., 
Canada, Australia and the U.K.  In each case, large upswings in the unemployment rate tend to 
be much steeper than the ensuing declines.
1 Various explanations of this phenomenon have been 
postulated, including behavioral inertia (Gay and Washer 1989), structural changes in the labor 
market (Groshen and Potter 2003), differential response of firms to shocks across the business 
cycle (Burgess and Turon 2005), and economic shocks affecting different aspects of the labor 
market depending on the direction of the shock (Bardsen et al. 2003).  Several statistical 
descriptions of the asymmetric time series pattern have also been proposed, including Hamilton 
(2005), Moshiri and Brown (2004), Rothman (2000), van Dijk et al. (2000), and Montgomery et 
al. (1998).     
[Figure 1 here] 
  The purpose of this paper is to identify and to explore the behavioral foundations of the 
asymmetric movement of the unemployment rate by modeling individual labor supply responses 
to changing labor market conditions.  If an individual’s labor supply decision is different when 
their employment prospects weaken than when they improve, then that asymmetric response 
                                                 
1 Similar asymmetric movement can be seen in the unemployment rate of other countries, as well (for example see 
Moshiri and Brown 2004).  Darby et al. (2001) document an opposite asymmetric movement of the unemployment 
rate across the business cycle in Japan. - 2 - 
will, in turn, contribute to the nonlinearity observed in the aggregate unemployment rate over 
time.  Identifying the micro-foundations for the observed aggregate time-series relationship will 
allow policy analysts to explain, and perhaps anticipate, changes to that relationship as individual 
characteristics of the population change.  Of course, because demand factors play an important 
role in determining the flow into and out of unemployment, changes in labor force participation 
behavior across the business cycle will not fully explain movements in the unemployment rate.  
However, this paper does identify the role that labor supply decisions could play in accounting 
for the observed asymmetry in aggregate unemployment rates. 
  The next section of the paper outlines the link between labor force participation decisions 
and the unemployment rate, and describes theoretical reasons why individual labor force 
sensitivity to labor market conditions could be expected to be asymmetric.  An empirical analysis 
of whether individual labor force participation decisions respond asymmetrically to changes in 
employment prospects is presented in section three, using micro-data on U.S. regional labor 
markets.  The fourth section summarizes the results and suggests various empirical implications 
for the aggregate unemployment rate.  The fifth section concludes.   
 
II. Theoretical Background 
  The basis for identifying the role that individual behavior plays in determining the source 
of asymmetric movements in the unemployment rate is the well-known inverse relationship 
between labor market conditions and individual labor force participation decisions.  In a weak 
labor market, unemployed individuals become discouraged and drop out of the labor market, 
reducing the labor force participation rate (LFPR).  Non-participants are also less likely to enter 
the labor market under these conditions.  In tight labor markets, individuals enter the labor - 3 - 
market to take advantage of promising employment opportunities, increasing the LFPR.   The so-
called "discouraged worker" effect provides the theoretical foundation for the observed counter-
cyclicality of labor force participation rates (Long 1958).
2  The question remains, however, as to 
whether the labor force participation response to the relative strength of the labor market is 
different depending on whether the labor market is weakening or strengthening.  Evidence of 
asymmetric labor force responses to changing labor market conditions would be the basis for 
linking asymmetric movement in the aggregate unemployment rate to individual labor supply 
decisions. 
  The standard labor/leisure choice model suggests why individual labor force sensitivity to 
labor market conditions might be expected to be asymmetric.  Assume that a person maximizes 
utility over two goods, income and leisure: 
max ( , )
L UU Y L = . 
Utility is increasing in both expected income (Y) and leisure (L), but there is a tradeoff between 
income and leisure summarized by the budget constraint: 
*
0 () YY TL W =+− , 
where  0 Y  is a person's non-labor income, T is the total amount of time a person has available to 
work, and 
* W  is the person's expected wage and reflects the cost of one hour of leisure.  The 
expected wage can be thought of as the product of the value of the person's human capital (the 
actual market wage for that person, W) and the probability that the person can find a job offering 
a certain number of hours of work (π ): 
                                                 
2 While the potential of an opposing "added worker" effect (Woytinsky 1940) is acknowledged, quantitatively the 
discouraged worker almost uniformly dominates any added worker influences, resulting in the counter-cyclicality of 
labor force participation.  The added worker effect contends that when a worker in a family loses his/her job during 
a recession, other members will enter the labor market (additional workers) to make up for the lost income.  See 
Borrow (2004) for further empirical evidence of the inverse relationship between the LFPR and the unemployment 
rate. - 4 - 
* WW π = . 
  For someone in the labor market but unemployed, a deterioration of employment 
prospects signals a reduction in π  and hence a lower expected wage.
3  This reduction in the 
price of leisure has both a substitution and income effect.
4  Other things equal, the lower 
expected wage means leisure is now less expensive, causing the person to seek fewer hours of 
work (reducing T−L), and in the extreme, to exit the labor market (T=L).  However, the lower 
expected wage also reduces expected income, causing the person to seek more hours of work.  
The desired number of hours of work will decline if the substitution effect dominates the income 
effect, and the discouraged worker will be one for whom the substitution effect is so large that 
the individual exits the labor market. 
  Conversely, a strengthening of the labor market signals an increase in π , which will raise 
the expected wage.  For someone out of the labor market, this higher expected wage will have 
only a substitution effect, raising the price of leisure and acting to pull the person into the labor 
market.  The key is that in this situation, there is no countervailing income effect; the entire 
pressure is to pull non-participants into the labor market. 
  Consequently, during periods when the labor market is weakening the resulting reduction 
in expected income lessens the pressure for unemployed workers to exit the labor market, but 
during periods of strengthening labor markets there is no such opposing force on individuals who 
are currently out of the labor force.  The implication is that the impact of changes in labor market 
conditions on exits from the labor market will be more sluggish than the impact on entrances.  
This is consistent with the finding of Gay and Wascher (1989), who find persistence in labor 
                                                 
3 There is also some evidence that weaker labor market conditions also directly, and negatively, affect the market 
wage (see Macis 2006). 
4 The income effect is clearly not literal since a change in the expected wage does not literally affect a person's 
income, but, rather, the person's expected income. - 5 - 
supply (once in the market, it takes longer for a person to leave, relative to how quickly a person 
enters), although they attribute the persistence to high entry costs and accumulated human 
capital, which they argue makes workers more insulated from transitory changes in labor 
demand.
5 
  Of course, labor force decisions have a feedback effect to the unemployment rate itself.  
The prediction of weaker exit and stronger entrance pressures suggests that the unemployment 
rate will rise relatively quickly during periods of economic weakness as people linger in 
unemployment, and fall more slowly when the economy recovers as people pour into the labor 
market to take advantage of new opportunities.  This scenario results in the asymmetric 
movement of the unemployment rate depicted in Figure 1.   
 
III. Empirical Method 
  The first goal of the empirical analysis is to establish whether individual labor force 
participation decisions respond asymmetrically to changes in the probability of finding 
employment (π ).  In other words, does a given decline in employment prospects decrease a 
person's tendency to be a labor market participant differently than it would increase if 
employment prospects improved by the same amount?  If so, then we know that at least some of 
the observed asymmetric movement of the unemployment rate across the business cycle has 
foundation in individual behavioral decisions.      
 
                                                 
5 Gay and Wascher (1989) also find greater persistence among those demographic groups for whom we find greater 
sensitivity to labor market conditions. - 6 - 
  A. Estimation Strategy 
  The baseline model is a standard probit model of individual labor force participation 
decisions, modified to incorporate movements in local labor market conditions.  The 
unemployment rate is used as the measure of labor market conditions because it is arguably the 
most direct measure of the difficulty labor force participants have in finding employment (π ).  
Other measures that might be considered are not nearly as desirable for this investigation.  For 
example, it would be difficult to argue that individuals can easily digest reports of GDP and what 
its movement means for their employment prospects.  In addition, the popular Employment-to-
Population ratio confounds the labor supply decision with worker demand.  The unemployment 
rate (which specifically measures among workers who want a job the percent that can't get one, 
and is widely reported and easily understood by the general population) is the closest measure of 
π  as it was defined in the previous section.   
  In the baseline model an individual's labor force participation decision at a particular 
point in time is specified as a function of a number of individual demographic and human capital 
characteristics, as well as the observed local unemployment rate in the previous period: 
  ()
'
ii i i LFP X UR φ βγ ε =+ Β + + , (1) 
where i X  are individual demographic and human capital characteristics, i UR is the lagged state-
level unemployment rate, i ε  is the random error component that is assumed to be Bernoulli 
distributed,  () φ ⋅  is the normal density function, and 









.  In other words, a person is in the labor force - 7 - 
(1 i LFP = ) if the utility of supplying a positive number of hours ( i LT < ) is greater than not 
working at all ( i LT = ). 
  The model in equation (1) is then modified to allow for the possibility of individuals' 
participation decisions responding to the unemployment rate differently depending on whether 
the unemployment rate is sufficiently higher or lower than it was a year ago.  The specification 
allows the response to vary according to the relative size of the unemployment rate change since 
it is possible that for some range of unemployment rate differences the response is not 
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and δ > 0.  This modified specification measures the extent to which individuals respond 
asymmetrically to changes in the unemployment rate.  The three parameters on the 
unemployment rate regressors in equation (2) measure how the individual's probability of labor 
force participation responds to the local unemployment rate when it is within δ units of what it 
                                                 
6 This specification is similar to that applied by Mocan and Bali (2005) to investigate the effect of movements in the 
unemployment rate on criminal activity.  Another application of a similar specification can be found in Koop and 
Potter (1999). - 8 - 
was a year ago ( 0 γ ), when it is δ units higher than it was last year ( 1 γ ), and when it is δ units 
lower than it was last year ( 2 γ ).
7 
  The symmetry threshold parameter, δ , is the amount by which the current 
unemployment rate has to differ from the unemployment rate last year before individuals 
respond differently according to the direction of the change in the unemployment rate.  Equation 
(2) is estimated for different values of δ , incremented by 0.1 percentage points.  The model 
parameter estimates are those which result at the value of δ which yields the largest likelihood 
function value.  Separate models are estimated for different gender and education groups.   
  The model specification in equation (2) allows a direct statistical test of asymmetric 
behavior.  The null hypothesis is that labor force participation decisions respond the same to 
changes in the unemployment rate regardless of whether it is higher or lower than it was a year 
ago: 
  0012 :  H γ γγ == (4) 
  In addition to the testable hypothesis depicted in equation (4), the estimate of δ  will 
provide an indication of the practical significance of any statistically significant asymmetric 
behavior.  For example, even if the null hypothesis of equation (4) is rejected, the value of δ  
may be so large as to preclude any useful expectation of differential behavior when the 
unemployment rate rises or falls. 
  For the most part, previous studies of the inverse relationship between the unemployment 
rate and labor force participation decisions have made use of aggregate data and have assumed 
                                                 
7 Various model specifications were estimates with no appreciable difference in any of the conclusions presented 
here.  Specifically, a model with a double-symmetry threshold parameter, a model with a continuous unemployment 
rate difference regressor, and a model with a simple unemployment rate movement (up or down) indicator variable 
were all explored.  These models were determined to be less complete or to offer no additional insight to the results 
obtained from estimating the model described by equation (2). - 9 - 
that the relationship is symmetrical (for example, see Darby et al. 2001, Gay and Wascher 1989, 
and Lenten 2000).  Exceptions include Blau (1978), who allows for a differential impact of the 
unemployment rate on entry and exit decisions of married women, and Blank and Shierholz 
(2005) who investigate how individual labor force decisions respond to labor market conditions 
across gender and education levels.  The analysis in this paper improves upon the investigation 
by Blau by using multiple years of data and by allowing a threshold effect across gender and 
education groups.  By allowing for asymmetric labor force responses, the present analysis will 
also expand upon the work by Blank and Shierholz. 
 
 B.  Data 
  Data on the outgoing rotation groups from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) is 
used to evaluate determinants of labor force participation behavior among men and women in the 
U.S. between the ages of 25 and 54.
8  The historical aggregate unemployment rate for this group 
is presented in Figure 2, and displays similar characteristics to the unemployment rate for all 
individuals over 16 shown in Figure 1.   
[Figure 2 here] 
The data used in the regression analysis cover the years 1994 through 2005; a major 
survey re-design in 1994 makes comparisons of labor force participation before and after 1994 
(especially for women) problematic (see Polivka 1996).  The CPS is used for two primary 
reasons.  First, these are the data from which the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates and reports 
                                                 
8 The CPS is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households conducted by the United States Bureau of the Census for 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The CPS is the primary source of information on the labor force characteristics of the 
U.S. population. The sample is selected to represent the civilian noninstitutional population, and respondents are 
interviewed to obtain information about the employment status of each member of the household 15 years of age 
and older.   
 - 10 - 
the labor force participation rate.  Second, it provides a consistent, long-running, and large 
sample on which to investigate systematic determinants of observed behavior.  All analyses are 
performed using the March supplement weight, since this is the only weight that is valid since 
2002 and since some of the regressors come from the supplemental part of the survey. 
  The usual demographic and human capital regressors are included in the specification.  
These include age; age squared; number of children under six years; number of children between 
six and 18 years; non-labor income; and amount of disability income, if any; and dummy 
variables for education (of course these are omitted when the sample is stratified by education); 
race; marital status; geographic region; and year in the sample.  All dollar variables are in 2004 
values.  The unemployment rate regressors are defined as in equation (3), where  t UR  
corresponds to the respondent's state-level unemployment rate for February in year t and  1 t UR −  is 
the respondent's state-level unemployment rate for February in the previous year.
9  While the 
sample time period includes only one national recession, within each year there is considerable 
variation across state-level unemployment rates with some respondents facing weaker and some 
facing stronger labor market conditions than in the previous year. 
  Sample means for the subgroups on which the model is estimated are presented in Table 
1.  The differences in the averages across the samples are typical.  For example, women are less 
likely to be in the labor force than men, women receive less disability income than men, and 
women are less likely to have less than a high school education.  In addition, college educated 
women are slightly younger and are more likely to have young (rather than older) children, than 
                                                 
9 Ideally, π would be tailored specifically to reflect each individual's employment prospects.  This would require a 
measure of the unemployment rate specific to each person's demographics (such as race to account for the potential 
impact of discrimination on employment opportunities), each person's human capital (such as education, industry, 
and occupation), and each person's geographic location.  In the absence of a more precise measure, we opt to use the 
state-level unemployment rate.  Geographic factors are likely to be important to an individual's specific employment 
prospects, and race and gender unemployment rates are available only at the national level.   - 11 - 
women with less than a college degree.  Both college-educated men and women are also more 
likely to married than their less-educated counterparts. 
[Table 1 here] 
 
IV. Results 
  There are several dimensions to the results of the analysis described above.  First, 
conditional on the estimate of δ , a statistical test is performed to determine if individual 
responses are significantly different when the unemployment rate is higher, the same, or lower 
than last year.  The second dimension of results is how behavior differs across gender and 
educational groups.  Do the labor force participation decisions of men and women and those with 
different education levels respond differently to a given change in the unemployment rate?  
Lastly, there is an issue of practical significance of any identified asymmetrical behavior.  Even 
if the specification in equation (3) is preferred statistically to the specification in equation (1), the 
estimated value of δ  may imply that behavior is asymmetric for only extremely large changes in 
the unemployment rate. 
  Table 2 summarizes the results across all three dimensions.  The value of δ  that 
maximizes the likelihood function for each subgroup is reported in column 1.  Column (1) is the 
range of unemployment rate changes for which the response is symmetric.  Columns (2)-(4) give 
the marginal sensitivity of the labor force participation rate of group j when the unemployment 
rate is, respectively, more than  j δ  higher, more than  j δ  lower, or within  j δ  of the rate in the 
preceding year.  The Wald test statistic corresponding to the null hypothesis in equation (4) is 
reported in column 5.  The ML parameter estimates at each sub-group's optimal symmetry 
threshold (δ ) are reported in Appendix A. - 12 - 
[Table 2 here] 
 
  A. The Estimate of the Symmetry Threshold Parameter 
  The estimate of  j δ  indicates the range of unemployment rate values within which labor 
force responses are symmetric for group j.  This range is narrower for women and, within 
gender, more narrow among the less educated.  Specifically, the labor force participation of 
women with less than a college education responds asymmetrically when the local area 
unemployment rate is more than 0.6 percentage points different than the unemployment rate of 
the previous year.  The least asymmetric behavior is exhibited by college-educated men, whose 
labor force response differs only when the unemployment rate is more than 2.1 percentage points 
higher or lower than the previous year.  
  The smaller symmetry thresholds for women and the less-educated means that it takes 
smaller movements in the unemployment rate to elicit asymmetric behavior from these 
demographic groups.  This implies that the aggregate unemployment rate should exhibit greater 
asymmetry among women and the less-educated over time.   
  Some casual evidence of this prediction can be found by comparing the length of time it 
takes the aggregate unemployment rate to go from peak to trough and from trough to peak 
around recessionary episodes.  Table 3 lists these average lengths of times (in quarters) for men, 
women, those with less than a high school degree, and those with a college degree or more.  As 
expected, the average number of quarters it takes the unemployment rate to go from peak to 
trough is longer for each group than the average number of quarters it takes to go from trough to 
peak (this is the asymmetry seen in Figure 2).  The larger difference between average peak-to-- 13 - 
trough quarters and trough-to-peak quarters for women and the less-educated provides some 
corroborating evidence of the greater asymmetry in the labor supply response of these groups.  
[Table 3 here] 
 
  B. Marginal Impact of the Unemployment Rate on Labor Force Participation 
  The results in columns 2-4 in Table 2 yield several predictable results.  First of all, labor 
force participation decisions of women and the less educated are more responsive to changes in 
the unemployment rate than those of men and the more educated, respectively.  This can be seen 
by the larger negative marginal effects.  For a 0.5 percentage point increase in the unemployment 
rate (a change smaller than any group's symmetry threshold), the expected labor force 
participation of a college-educated woman decreases by 0.18 percentage points and for a less-
educated woman by 0.87 percentage points.  By contrast, for the same increase in the 
unemployment rate, the expected labor force participation of a college-educated man will 
decrease by 0.09 percentage points and of a less-educated man by 0.48 percentage points.  Men 
are half as sensitive to changes in labor market conditions as their educationally equivalent 
female counterparts. 
  These results are to be expected given the weaker labor force attachment of women and 
the less educated to the labor market.
10  Weaker attachment means that the value of time out of 
the labor market (the person's reservation wage) is higher.  As a result, for any given decrease in 
chances of finding a job (π ), the expected wage will be more likely to fall below the reservation 
wage for women and the less educated than it is for men or the more educated.  In addition, when 
prospects improve (π  increases), women and the less educated are more likely to be out of the 
                                                 
10 Evidence of weaker labor market attachment of women and the less-educated can be found in  Erosa et al. (2005) 
and Antecol and Bedard (2004). - 14 - 
labor market to begin with and be feeling the stronger pressures of the positive substitution effect 
pulling them into the labor market. 
  The implication of this greater sensitivity to changing labor market conditions is that for 
whatever asymmetric behavior exists, and for a given change in labor demand, women and the 
less-educated enter and exit the labor force more quickly in response to changing labor market 
conditions and, thus, the amplitude of the unemployment rate cycles, ceteris paribus, will be 
smaller for women and the less educated.  In other words, when more workers exit the labor 
force as jobs are lost, the unemployment rate doesn't rise as high, and when more workers enter 
the labor force when jobs are created, the unemployment rate doesn't fall as far.  Since labor 
demand is quite different for workers with different education levels, it would be difficult to 
confirm the smaller amplitude implied by changes in labor supply for less-educated workers by 
simply comparing unemployment rates cycles across education.  However, Figure 3 suggests that 
the implication of smaller amplitude of aggregate unemployment rate cycles for women is borne 
out when comparing aggregate unemployment rate cycles of men and women, at least since the 
1980s.  
[Figure 3 here] 
  The second result of note from columns 2-4 in Table 2 is the uniformly larger impact of a 
change in the unemployment rate on labor force participation decisions when the unemployment 
rate has declined.  In other words, the signal that local labor market conditions are improving  
increases the probability of participating in the labor market by a larger amount across both 
gender and education groups than the probability declines when the unemployment rate has 
risen.  For example, when the unemployment rate is more than 0.6 percentage points higher than 
a year earlier, a one percentage point rise in the unemployment rate lowers the expected - 15 - 
participation rate of a college-educated woman by 0.37 percentage points.  But when the 
unemployment rate is more than 0.6 percentage points lower than a year earlier, a one percentage 
point decline in the unemployment rate raises the participation probability by 0.60 percentage 
points (almost twice the impact of an unemployment rate increase of the same absolute 
magnitude). 
  The finding of a larger labor force participation response to improvements in local labor 
market conditions relative to declines is consistent with the behavioral explanation offered for 
observing asymmetric movement of the unemployment rate across the business cycle.  The 
conflicting income and substitution effect dampens the exiting of the labor market as the 
economy weakens, but the entrance of non-participants as the economy improves is spurred by 
the absence of an income effect. 
 
  C. Statistical and Practical Significance of Asymmetric Behavior  
  Column 5 of Table 2 provides a test of how significant the statistical difference is 
between assuming symmetric labor force response to changes in the economy and allowing that 
behavior to respond asymmetrically.  The null hypothesis in equation (4) is rejected for all sub-
groups except college-educated men.  Even for those groups for whom the null hypothesis is 
rejected, there is also an issue of practical significance that must be addressed.  For men (of both 
education levels) the estimates of δ  are especially large.  In fact, for men with less than a 
college education the response to the level of the unemployment rate is symmetric for 94.2 
percent of the sample, and symmetric for 99.0 percent of the sample of college educated men 
(see Table 4).  So for almost all unemployment comparisons, the asymmetry does not influence 
male participation decisions, although the level of the unemployment rate does.  The asymmetry - 16 - 
is more relevant for females, and especially for less-educated women.  For women with less than 
a college education the response to the level of the unemployment rate is symmetric for 62.4 
percent of the sample, and symmetric for 78.4 percent of the sample of college educated women.   
[Table 4 here] 
 
  D. Implications of an Aging Population 
  A practical application of the analysis presented in this paper is to explore behavioral 
labor supply responses to changes in labor market conditions across a variety of demographic 
characteristics.  The reason for doing this would be to anticipate the impact of changes in those 
characteristics on movement in the aggregate unemployment rate.  One important change that 
will be taking place in the U.S. over the next twenty years is the aging of the population.  
According to U.S. Census population projections, the fastest growing age group in the U.S. 
between 2010 and 2030 are those between 65 and 85 years of age.
11  Between 2000 and 2010, 
the fastest growing age group will be those 45 to 64.  A natural question is what sort of 
implication this demographic shift might have on the behavior of the unemployment rate.  In this 
regard, the analysis described above is repeated for different age groups of men and women.  For 
three age groups, Table 5 contains the estimates of the symmetry threshold parameter, marginal 
effects of a one percentage point change in the unemployment rate, and the Wald test statistic for 
the null hypothesis of symmetric behavior.  Of course, extrapolating these results into the future 
requires strong assumptions about the constancy of preferences and worker demand. 
[Table 5 here] 
                                                 
11 U.S. Census Bureau, "U.S. Interim Projections by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin," 
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/ (accessed 12 May 2006). - 17 - 
  The attractiveness of alternative activities for the younger (e.g., schooling) and the older 
(e.g., retirement) groups, means that they will naturally be more marginally attached to the labor 
market, making their responses to changes in local labor market conditions stronger.  For 
example, for a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, the expected labor force 
participation for women progresses from -1.64 percentage points for 18-24 year olds, to -1.12 
percentage points for 25-54 year olds, to -1.27 for 55-74 year olds.  For men, the responses are -
1.35 for 18-24 year olds, -0.73 for 25-54 year olds, and -1.56 for 55-74 year olds.   
  The pattern seen earlier of greater labor market sensitivity of women aged 25-54, relative 
to men, is also seen among the younger age group.  A one percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate reduces women's expected labor force participation by 1.64 percentage 
points but only reduces men's by 1.35 percentage points.  The difference across gender is even 
more dramatic when local labor market conditions are improving, because at any given time 
women are more likely to be out of the labor market, feeling the pull of the substitution effect as 
conditions improve.  The relative sensitivity across gender is much more similar for the older age 
group.  For a 0.7 percentage point or less increase in the local unemployment rate, the expected 
labor force participation among men declines by 1.20 percentage points and among women by 
1.27 percentage points.  In addition, the labor supply response is much more symmetric for older 
women than it is at earlier ages or than it is for men.  It takes an unemployment rate change of 
1.8 percentage points or more for older women to respond differently to weakening or 
strengthening labor market conditions. 
  As a whole, however, the labor supply decisions of older workers are generally more 
responsive to changes in local labor market conditions than mid-aged workers, suggesting that 
the aggregate unemployment rate (all else equal) will exhibit less variation over time as the - 18 - 
population ages.  In addition, while the symmetry threshold declines with age among men, it 
increases for women, and given that women are still (and will probably continue to be) the 
marginal worker between the two, overall asymmetry should decrease, again, ceteris paribus.  
  Interestingly, the direction of the asymmetry reverses for older men, compared with all 
other age and gender groups.  The results in Table 5 suggest that the labor supply decisions of 
older men respond more dramatically to rising unemployment rates than declining 
unemployment rates.  This is not consistent with the theoretical predictions presented earlier.  
However, since men have typically accumulated greater wealth by retirement age, because of 
their more extensive labor market experience, labor market exits may be more feasible at age 55 
and beyond for men than for women.  It may also be the case that older men have deteriorating 
skills or physical abilities that make continued labor market attachment less attractive at older 
ages.  This may be less true for women as they age, given that skill or physical atrophy are 
typically not as critical in traditional female occupations. 
 
V. Conclusions 
  Individual decisions about labor force participation (which are sensitive to the strength of 
the labor market) are found to respond differently to local labor market conditions, depending on 
whether the labor market is getting stronger, increasing employment opportunities, or whether 
the labor market is getting weaker, decreasing employment opportunities.  This asymmetric 
individual labor supply response to changes in local labor market conditions is probably 
responsible for at least some of the asymmetry observed in the aggregate movements of the U.S. 
unemployment rate, although it doesn't rule out other potential contributors, such as fixed costs 
to labor market entry or sticky wages.   - 19 - 
   It was determined that for those between the ages of 25 and 54, behavior among women 
and the less-educated exhibits the greatest degree of asymmetry, whereas college-educated men 
respond the same to changes in labor market conditions regardless of whether conditions are 
improving or weakening.  It was also found that the labor force participation decisions of women 
and the less-educated are more sensitive overall, which, ceteris paribus, likely contributes to 
flatter unemployment rate series for these groups. Given the results presented here, one might 
expect that as women continue to become more attached to the labor market, their behavior will 
more closely emulate that of men, with the result being greater symmetry and greater variation in 
the U.S. aggregate unemployment rate series.  In addition, the same tendencies will occur as the 
percent of the population with a college degree continues to increase.   
  In consideration of the rapidly aging population in the U.S., the analysis was repeated for 
younger (18-24 year olds) and older (55-74 year olds) age groups.  The results suggest that as the 
population ages, other things equal, the aggregate unemployment rate will likely becoming less 
variable and more symmetric. 
This type of analysis could easily be repeated to determine how other demographic 
changes (e.g., race, marital status) might affect the nature of aggregate data series.  Also, while 
the quantitative results are applicable only to the U.S. experience, the conceptual and empirical 
framework could be applied to individual labor supply responses in other countries as well. - 20 - 
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (http://www.cps.gov). - 3 - 
Table 1. Sample means. 
 
 Men  Women 








Labor Force Participant = 1  0.890  0.959  0.738  0.844 
Age  38.920 39.874 39.358 39.012 
No. of Children LT 6  0.262  0.316  0.288  0.324 
No. of Children 6-18  0.582  0.587  0.783  0.585 
Married, spouse present = 1  0.588  0.686  0.618  0.671 
Less than high school degree  0.182  0  0.154  0 
High  school  degree  0.818 0 0.846 0 
College degree or more  0  1  0  1 
Non-labor  income  22.044 31.214 36.229 58.808 
Black  =  1  0.138 0.069 0.158 0.093 
Disability  income  114.824  69.561 63.324 62.525 
Northeast  =  1  0.181 0.221 0.186 0.227 
Midwest  =  1  0.239 0.232 0.236 0.231 
South  =  1  0.364 0.327 0.370 0.338 
West  =  1  0.215 0.219 0.208 0.203 
      
No.  of  Observations  372,494 268,156 406,250 297,112 
      
Note:  All dollar values are 2004 values.  Sample is from the outgoing rotation groups of the 
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Table 2. Estimation results, by gender and education, ages 25-54; the marginal impact on labor 
force participation of a one percentage point change in the local unemployment rate. 
 
 
ˆ δ  
(1) 






















00 1 2 : H γ γγ == 
(5) 
Men         
   LT College  1.8  -0.81  -0.97  -1.37  21.98 (0.00) 
   College or more  2.1  -0.01  -0.19  -0.51  3.50 (0.17) 
Women         
   LT College  0.6  -1.46  -1.74  -1.97  45.85 (0.00) 
   College or more  0.9  -0.37  -0.37  -0.60  8.36 (0.02) 
         
Notes:  The marginal effects are calculated for each person, then averaged across the sample.  
Parameter estimates from a maximum likelihood estimation of a probit model are contained in 
Appendix A.  Column 1 is the range of unemployment rate changes (since last year) for which 
the response is symmetric.  Columns 2-4 give the marginal sensitivity of the labor force 
participation decision for group j when the unemployment rate is, respectively, more than  j δ  
higher, more than  j δ  lower, or within  j δ  of last year.  Column 5 reports the Wald test statistic, 
which is distributed as a chi-squared random variable with two degrees of freedom under the null 
hypothesis that labor force participation decisions are made symmetrically with regard to 
changes in the unemployment rate.  The number in parentheses are the associated p-values. 
 - 5 - 
 
 
Table 3. Average Number of Quarters from Peak to Trough and from Trough to Peak, U.S. 
Quarterly Unemployment Rate 1978-2005. 
 
  Average Number of Quarters   
  
Peak to Trough 
 
Trough to Peak 
Difference 
(P→T)-(T→P) 
Men  20.7 10.0 10.7 
Women  20.7 9.3 11.4 
College or more  32.0  8.0  23 
Less than High School  33.0  9.0  25 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (www.bls.gov).  The 
unemployment rate movements for men and women correspond to those 25-54 years of age.  
Movements in the unemployment rate by education level correspond to those 25 years and older.- 6 - 
 
Table 4. Distribution of Sample. 
 





tt UR UR δ − < −
(3) 
11 ˆˆ
tt t UR UR UR δ δ −− − ≤< +  
(4) 
1 ˆ
tt UR UR δ − ≥+
(5) 
Men          
   Less than college degree  1.8  372,494  1.5% 94.2% 4.3% 
   College degree or more  2.1  268,156  0.4% 99.0% 0.6% 
        
Women        
   Less than college degree  0.6  406,250  23.5% 62.4% 14.1% 
   College degree or more  0.9  297,112  10.6% 78.4% 11.0% 
 
Notes:  This table presents the percent of the sample that faces a state unemployment rate that is 
more than d lower than last year's unemployment rate (column 3), that is within d of last year's 
rate (column 4), and that is greater than d higher than last year's rate (column 5).  - 7 - 
Table 5. Estimation results, by gender and age; the marginal impact on labor force participation 
of a one percentage point change in the local unemployment rate. 
 
 
ˆ δ  
(1) 






















00 1 2 : H γ γγ == 
(5) 
Men         
   Ages 18-24  0.6  -1.35  -1.50  -1.74  9.39 (0.01) 
   Ages 25-54  1.8  -0.62  -0.73  -1.06  22.94 (0.00) 
   Ages 55-74  0.7  -1.56  -1.20  -1.30  6.79 (0.03) 
Women         
   Ages 18-24  0.2  -1.64  -1.49  -2.01  31.02 (0.00) 
   Ages 25-54  0.6  -1.12  -1.36  -1.56  52.61 (0.00) 
   Ages 55-74  1.8  -1.20  -1.27  -2.25  26.39 (0.00) 
         
Notes:  See notes to table 2.  Parameter estimates from a maximum likelihood estimation of the 
probit model are contained in Table A2. - 8 - 
Table A1. Maximum likelihood probit estimates of labor force participation (equation 2), by 
gender and education, ages 25-54. 
 
 Men  Women 
































































































































































































        
No.  of  Observations  268,156 104,338 297,112 109,138 
ˆ δ   1.8 2.1 0.6 0.9 
Log-likelihood  -82,605.15  -16,414.43 -159,379.70 -42,432.96 
Note:  All dollar values are 2004 values.  All estimations include a set of year fixed-effects.  
* 
indicates significance at the one percent level, 
+ indicates significance at the five percent level 
and 
^ indicates significance at the ten percent level. - 9 - 
Table A2. Maximum likelihood probit estimates of the labor force participation (equation 2) by gender and age. 
 
                                   Men                                                                        Women 















































































































































































































































No.  of  Observations  76499 372494  123080 80551 406250  141449 
^
δ  
0.6 1.8 0.7 0.2 0.6 1.8 
Log-likelihood  -39190.88  -99448.72 -67078.066 -46957.42 -202029.07 -75607.28 
Note: All dollar values are 2004 values.  All estimations include a set of year fixed-effects.  * indicates significance at the one 
percent level, + indicates significance at the five percent level and ^ indicates significance at the ten percent level. 